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It is an honor to engage in a critical dialogue with Jessica A. Stanton. Her book, Violence 
and Restraint in Civil War, is written from a completely different theoretical and 
methodological perspective to Economy of Force.1 Yet I can easily recognise it as an 
extremely impressive example of American political science: rigorous, logical, 
impeccably researched, and lucidly expressed. Today, civil war is the most widespread 
and destructive form of organised violence. Stanton’s book is not a history or theory of 
civil war, civilians, or international law. Rather it tests a series of empirical hypotheses 
concerning civilian targeting in civil wars with original quantitative and qualitative data, 
much of it painstakingly gathered by Stanton. In our world of internationalized civil war, 
the headline conclusions are important and clear. Violence against civilians during civil 
war is the result of strategic choices by government and rebel group leaders. The way in 
which governments and rebel groups calculate the most effective level and form of 
violence against civilians is influenced by their own and their enemy’s relationships with 
domestic and international constituencies. Violence is strategic and so is the choice to 
restrain the level of violence. International actors play a significant role in shaping 
government and rebel group incentive to target civilians. 
Stanton illustrates her central argument through a quantitative analysis of forms of 
government and rebel group violence against civilians in all civil wars from 1989 to 2010. 
This is supplemented by a series of case studies, the war between the Indonesia 
government and rebels in both Aceh and East Timor, Turkey and the PKK, and rebel 
group actions in El Salvador, Azerbaijan, and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. 
Stanton finds that restraint in targeting civilians is more likely when military and political 
leaders are responsive to their own public’s demands; when they have an inclusive 
political system; and when regimes are unstable and thus require domestic and 
international support. Belligerents are more likely to engage in high casualty civilian 
control the greater the civilian support for the opponent; engage in high casualty 
cleansing if the opponent relies on a small, geographically concentrated civilian base; and 
engage in terrorism if their own political system is exclusionary and the enemy is 
responsive to public demands. Most governments and rebel groups have a strong 
incentive to present themselves as legitimate international actors eligible for political and 
economic assistance. For Stanton, an important incentive for restraint is increasing 
acceptance of international human rights and humanitarian norms since the end of the 
Cold War. Violence and Restraint wears its theoretical influences lightly, but it clearly 
sits within the liberal internationalist tradition.  
Stanton is not only interested in the scale of violence deliberately targeted against 
civilians, but the strategic choice of its form, including terrorism, interrogations and 
extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, territorial ‘cleansing’, scorched earth campaigns, 
forced displacement, and genocide.  Violence and Restraint presents a spectrum of 
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violence in civil war, from restraint and low casualty violence to high causality violence. 
However, the designations are thoroughly normative. For example, Stanton notes that 
rather than commit genocide, the Turkish government sought to separate Kurdish fighters 
from civilian support by forcibly depopulating four thousand Kurdish villages, as well as 
engage in extrajudicial executions and torture of thousands of pro-independence political 
activists. Hence, according to Stanton, through the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey engaged in a 
strategy of low-casualty cleansing and state terrorism. In response to international and 
domestic criticisms Turkey later moderated some of its most brutal policies. By the 2000s, 
‘the government calculated that high casualty violence against civilians was not worth the 
risk of jeopardizing the country’s application or EU membership’. 2  Even though the 
overall number of Kurdish civilians killed by the Turkish state in its ‘low casualty’ war 
vastly exceeded those killed by rebels, Stanton describes PKK attacks on Turkish 
civilians as an example of ‘high casualty terrorism’. Clearly such designations are 
political. The designation of what is high and low casualty is not descriptive, but 
normative. Indeed, as Eyal Weizman has shown, the power to moderate violence, to be 
seen to restrain, can produce its own form of political power and even terror among those 
purportedly spared.3 
Stanton addresses an important dimension of the strategic environment in which 
belligerents in civil war weigh the costs of civilian targeting, namely pressures to comply 
with international human rights standards. This question is central to the framing of the 
book in the Introduction and Conclusion, but plays less of a role in the analysis and 
development of the case studies. Indeed, if international actors are fundamental in 
shaping government and rebel group incentive to target civilians, then a greater and more 
immediate factor is military and other assistance from hegemonic powers, the most 
powerful international constituency there is. Thus I would be extremely interested to hear 
Stanton’s hypotheses concerning the relationship between US military and financial aid 
to belligerents and the degree of restraint in targeting civilians. Consider the US-backed 
Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor (1975-1999). Stanton’s powerful 
account of Indonesia’s high casualty ‘cleansing’, the forcible relocation in camps, the 
burning of villages and crops, recalls near identical United States practices in Vietnam, 
and British actions in Malaya and Kenya, which I discuss in Economy of Force. In 
‘Government Restraint in Indonesia’, Chapter 4 of Violence and Restraint, Stanton 
argues that Indonesia’s counterinsurgency strategy, essentially the ‘institutionalization of 
terror’, fundamentally transformed after the 1998 fall of General Suharto. The new 
civilian leadership, in need of different forms of international support during the 
transition to democracy, had to rein in some of the military’s worst excesses and provide 
some humanitarian assistance and reduce torture and detention ‘without due process’.4 
Indonesian elites used the opportunity of transition to acknowledge some past atrocities, 
reform military and police, and reduce attacks on civilians. However, as Stanton notes, 
the Indonesian ‘military’s financial independence has impeded efforts to implement 
effective civilian control over the military, helping to explain why… incidents of military 
abuse continued even after the transition to democracy’.5   
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Is the role of ‘international actors’ in Indonesia’s counterinsurgency campaign 
best understood in these terms, of Cold War neglect and post-Cold War human rights 
advocacy? In Violence and Restraint, the role of ‘international actors’ during Suharto’s 
reign is primarily an act of omission: ‘international actors… did not pressure Suharto to 
alter his policies in Aceh or East Timor’.6 But as an extremely close ally of the United 
States, General Suharto was not only able ‘to avoid any serious international criticism of 
his counterinsurgency operations’ and thus ‘had few incentives to exercise restraint’.7 His 
most important international constituents were implicated in the slaughter of almost a 
third of the East Timorese, as arms suppliers and financiers. Suharto could kill with such 
impunity because he could rely on the diplomatic and ideological cover provided by the 
United States, Britain, and Australia who were more interested in Indonesia’s resource 
rich emerging market. In this sense, the role of international actors in Suharto’s choice to 
commit crimes against humanity was an act of commission. This is not just a Cold War 
story. After official military aid was cut off and the transition to democracy had begun the 
United States continued to train Indonesian troops implicated in the torture and killing of 
civilians.8 The end of the Cold War is not always and everywhere the watershed that it 
often appears, as Iraqi civilians can also attest. The claim to be complying with 
international human rights standards is often ideological too. 
Violence and Restraint raises fundamental questions about the strategic choice to 
target or refrain from targeting civilians in civil war. It is also provides a good starting 
point to think through the many roles of ‘international actors’ in contemporary and 
internationalized civil wars. Stanton writes, ‘when a government is insulated from both 
domestic and international pressure, it is extremely difficult to prevent atrocities against 
civilians or to halt abuses once they have begun’.9  But it is integration, rather than 
insulation, from the global order of capitalist neo-imperialism that can generate, as well 
as prevent, atrocities against civilians. Not all international constituencies are equally 
influential and civil wars are not only ‘a struggle for political power at the domestic 
level’.10 The over-emphasis on international human rights standards can obscure as well 
as reveal much about the global military and economic order in which civil wars occur 
and are sustained.  
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Response to Stanton’s review of Economy of Force 
 
I’m grateful to Jessica A. Stanton for her generous reading of Economy of Force. She has 
captured a great deal of what I see as the main contributions of the book, especially those 
related to the despotic character of counterinsurgency rule. What she identifies as its main 
limitation, especially in relation to case selection, is broadly accurate. Economy of Force 
offers a new history and theory of Anglo-American counterinsurgency with major 
implications for social, political, and international thought. The historical case studies 
focus on late-colonial military campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and Vietnam, as well as the 
more recent multinational campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The book does not address 
the very many other comparable historical and contemporary pacification campaigns 
conducted by other imperial or post-colonial states, though many of its main arguments 
would certainly apply to them. While the primary motivation of the book was not to 
pinpoint variation in forms of civilian coercion across cases, the central focus of 
Stanton’s book, Economy of Force does not entirely neglect major differences in this 
regard. It argues that the dynamics of oikonomia in the use of force varied in relation to 
the level of organized resistance; the resources available to the counterinsurgency state; 
the perceived racial ‘Otherness’ of the target population and other racialized and 
gendered practices; and the degree of external support provided to insurgents. 
 Economy of Force is motivated not only by the inadequacies of existing theories 
of counterinsurgency war, but also the a-historicism of approaches to social and 
sociological theories in International Relations more generally. Stanton did not take up 
this wider contribution. Economy of Force not only seeks to historicize and critique social 
and sociological theory to give a better account of so-called ‘armed social work’. It 
challenges the deeply ahistorical manner in which the field of International Relations has 
imported social and sociological theories. While IR practices a form of ‘sociolatry’, the 
worship of things ‘socio’, 11  it has ignored the historical origins of distinctly social 
theorising, demonstrating very little sense of when and why sociological explanations for 
human affairs first emerged and what this history might reveal. Economy of Force 
explains why this matters. International and even much political theory has been blind to 
the more fundamental governance form of which the modern social realm is a concrete 
historical expression. The late eighteenth-century rise of social forms of governance in 
the core of the major European capitalist empires did not destroy and replace household 
activities and forms of thought, as both liberalism and social theory claimed. They are the 
distinctly modern and capitalist variant on the science and practice of household rule. 
This is why neither liberalism nor social theory has offered an adequate theory of politics, 
assimilating it to household rule. In contrast, Economy of Force conceives politics as 
non-domestication and thus, pace much contemporary critical theory, is able to 
distinguish between politics and war. 
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